I think the author is asking an important question: why is Muslim minority thought and activism in the West so often fragmented, reactive, and theoretically thin? That is a real issue where the debate becomes a mud slinging match (especially online)
However - article treats modus vivendi too narrowly. It presents it as the default compromise for Muslims in the West, but in reality many other groups, Christians, Jews, communists, socialists, and large numbers of apolitical citizens also live within a liberal-capitalist order without fully endorsing its deepest principles.
The argument also feels dated, because it seems written from a late-1990s “end of history” perspective, while today the liberal order is being contested from within especially from a right wing christian identities.
The more serious issue is that the piece reduces the options to a false binary: either Muslims must fully liberalise their political thought (any muslim radio presenter from LBC or elected Muslim MP's in mainstream parties), or they must accept some form of containment! (Zia Yusuf from reform mode). That is too restrictive, especially when comparable non-liberal worldviews are not asked to make the same concession.
A better question is whether new ideas and institutional forms can emerge before sovereignty is fully settled, and whether states such as China, Iran, and the Taliban in Afghanistan show that once sovereignty is secured, there is more room to experiment with different models of state and economy. What sovereignty means for internal minorities or individuals living in an insecure liberal state that continuously finds ways of punishing unorthodox views.
I also think the article is right that the Islamic tradition is not static (not sure who disagrees with this), but it is missing an socially operational method for turning scattered intuitions into coherent political thinking. Something like Mao’s “from the masses, to the masses” logic: thinkers / leaders collect dispersed experiences, concentrate them into an intelligible line, and return them to practice for testing and revision (something our ulama / thinkers are not in the habbit of doing).
The problem is not simply permission to reason or institution to reason within, but the absence of a social mechanism for doing so, although I would say this is improving all the time within the community.
Writing a whole piece on activism in the west without referring to an actual individual activist or group is just a personal red flag.
The reference to Taqi Usmani is also somewhat disingenuous. His claim that sovereignty belongs to Allah is better understood as a constitutional limit on legislative bodies, not as a simple rejection of lawmaking altogether. In that framework, laws must remain within the wider vision of Qur’an and Sunna. Although I have no idea what this will look like (an Iranian style supreme leader who has Isma, a Guardian Council with life time membership like the american supreme court couples with a constitution that protects fundamental rights, a European style constitution obliging the state to provide X,Y Z) This is something Mufti Taqi is super vague on.
> The argument also feels dated, because it seems written from a late-1990s “end of history” perspective, while today the liberal order is being contested from within especially from a right wing christian identities
Agree here. People are tired of having to fight for their values every day just for them to be 1 court ruling away from being overturned. The liberal order is an anomaly historically and it doesn't make sense to try to put everyone under the same polity. You end up with neighbors that have to lie to one another to maintain civility. An arrangement of many polities and respected borders between them would make everything more honest.
> It presents it as the default compromise for Muslims in the West, but in reality many other groups, Christians, Jews, communists, socialists, and large numbers of apolitical citizens also live within a liberal-capitalist order without fully endorsing its deepest principles.
Disagree here. These groups live in the liberal-capitalist order by having abandoned everything that made their traditions "thick" or load bearing. Christians in the West are largely tourists. Christian as an aesthetic or lifestyle brand. Which is why your sovereignty point matters.
On sovereignty -- the real question for Western Muslims (or all people, really. African American, Christian, Jew, even secular liberal once it notices it's also a formation) may not be "what terms of containment are acceptable" but "what does a path to meaningful sovereignty look like" — whether that's demographic, territorial, institutional, or some combination.
I understand your disagreement. By Christian I meant fully practicing Christian.
I'm reminded of the 2023 SNP leadership contest for Scottish First Minister, Kate Forbes (a practicing Christian) faced scrutiny for opposing gay marriage due to her faith, while Humza Yousaf (Muslim) supported it without similar backlash. Mainstream media largely favored Yousaf, portraying Forbes as the outlier on this issue.
Given the disproportionate birth rates between liberal hosts and embedded Muslim communities, wdyt the long term outcome of containment would really be in practice?
If the other option pans out (minimal liberalism), what does this do to the Muslim tradition over the long haul? Arguably, liberalism is creating atomized and hollowed out subjects. Is this then the fate of the Muslim tradition over a long enough time line? Declining birth rates, minimal community, high anxiety, no purpose.
I think the author is asking an important question: why is Muslim minority thought and activism in the West so often fragmented, reactive, and theoretically thin? That is a real issue where the debate becomes a mud slinging match (especially online)
However - article treats modus vivendi too narrowly. It presents it as the default compromise for Muslims in the West, but in reality many other groups, Christians, Jews, communists, socialists, and large numbers of apolitical citizens also live within a liberal-capitalist order without fully endorsing its deepest principles.
The argument also feels dated, because it seems written from a late-1990s “end of history” perspective, while today the liberal order is being contested from within especially from a right wing christian identities.
The more serious issue is that the piece reduces the options to a false binary: either Muslims must fully liberalise their political thought (any muslim radio presenter from LBC or elected Muslim MP's in mainstream parties), or they must accept some form of containment! (Zia Yusuf from reform mode). That is too restrictive, especially when comparable non-liberal worldviews are not asked to make the same concession.
A better question is whether new ideas and institutional forms can emerge before sovereignty is fully settled, and whether states such as China, Iran, and the Taliban in Afghanistan show that once sovereignty is secured, there is more room to experiment with different models of state and economy. What sovereignty means for internal minorities or individuals living in an insecure liberal state that continuously finds ways of punishing unorthodox views.
I also think the article is right that the Islamic tradition is not static (not sure who disagrees with this), but it is missing an socially operational method for turning scattered intuitions into coherent political thinking. Something like Mao’s “from the masses, to the masses” logic: thinkers / leaders collect dispersed experiences, concentrate them into an intelligible line, and return them to practice for testing and revision (something our ulama / thinkers are not in the habbit of doing).
The problem is not simply permission to reason or institution to reason within, but the absence of a social mechanism for doing so, although I would say this is improving all the time within the community.
Writing a whole piece on activism in the west without referring to an actual individual activist or group is just a personal red flag.
The reference to Taqi Usmani is also somewhat disingenuous. His claim that sovereignty belongs to Allah is better understood as a constitutional limit on legislative bodies, not as a simple rejection of lawmaking altogether. In that framework, laws must remain within the wider vision of Qur’an and Sunna. Although I have no idea what this will look like (an Iranian style supreme leader who has Isma, a Guardian Council with life time membership like the american supreme court couples with a constitution that protects fundamental rights, a European style constitution obliging the state to provide X,Y Z) This is something Mufti Taqi is super vague on.
> The argument also feels dated, because it seems written from a late-1990s “end of history” perspective, while today the liberal order is being contested from within especially from a right wing christian identities
Agree here. People are tired of having to fight for their values every day just for them to be 1 court ruling away from being overturned. The liberal order is an anomaly historically and it doesn't make sense to try to put everyone under the same polity. You end up with neighbors that have to lie to one another to maintain civility. An arrangement of many polities and respected borders between them would make everything more honest.
> It presents it as the default compromise for Muslims in the West, but in reality many other groups, Christians, Jews, communists, socialists, and large numbers of apolitical citizens also live within a liberal-capitalist order without fully endorsing its deepest principles.
Disagree here. These groups live in the liberal-capitalist order by having abandoned everything that made their traditions "thick" or load bearing. Christians in the West are largely tourists. Christian as an aesthetic or lifestyle brand. Which is why your sovereignty point matters.
On sovereignty -- the real question for Western Muslims (or all people, really. African American, Christian, Jew, even secular liberal once it notices it's also a formation) may not be "what terms of containment are acceptable" but "what does a path to meaningful sovereignty look like" — whether that's demographic, territorial, institutional, or some combination.
I understand your disagreement. By Christian I meant fully practicing Christian.
I'm reminded of the 2023 SNP leadership contest for Scottish First Minister, Kate Forbes (a practicing Christian) faced scrutiny for opposing gay marriage due to her faith, while Humza Yousaf (Muslim) supported it without similar backlash. Mainstream media largely favored Yousaf, portraying Forbes as the outlier on this issue.
> accept at least some containment
Given the disproportionate birth rates between liberal hosts and embedded Muslim communities, wdyt the long term outcome of containment would really be in practice?
If the other option pans out (minimal liberalism), what does this do to the Muslim tradition over the long haul? Arguably, liberalism is creating atomized and hollowed out subjects. Is this then the fate of the Muslim tradition over a long enough time line? Declining birth rates, minimal community, high anxiety, no purpose.